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COMMENTS
THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS IN
MASSACHUSETTS: SUPERINTENDENT OF
WORCESTER STATE HOSPITAL
I.

v.

HAGBERG*

INTRODUCTION

Mrs. Laura Hagberg, a woman in her seventies, was temporar
ily admitted to Worcester State Hospital on September 12, 1975. 1
When admitted she was disoriente<;l and unable to care for hers~lf
"because of age and infirmity. "2 She was diagnosed as mentally ill,
suffering from organic brain syndrome and from generalized and
cerebral arteriosclerosis. 3 At the end of the ten day emergency
commitment period the hospital petitioned for her extended in
voluntary commitment.
At her commitment hearing the trial judge rejected a ruling
requested by Mrs. Hagberg's counsel that the standard of proof
in proceedings under the civil commitment statute, chapter 123,
should be beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 Instead, the court relied
upon the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and, de
spite her "generally improved" condition, committed Mrs. Hagberg
to Worcester State Hospital for six months. 5 The Appellate Divi
* 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187 aff'g Myerson v. Hagberg, 1975 Mass. App. Dec. Adv.
Sh. 506. The author worked for the Mental Patients Advocacy Project in North
ampton, Massachusetts, which entered the case as amicus curiae. He assisted staff
attorney Jan C. Costello in the preparation of a brief submitted to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court on behalf of Mrs. Hagberg and other persons subject to peti
tions for civil commitment.
1. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-78) authorizes emergency commitment for up to 10 days of persons
believed to pose a "likelihood of serious harm." See note 20 illfra, for a discussion of
this standard. Individuals committed under this section must be discharged at the
end of the 10 day period unless they remain on a voluntary status or the superinten
dent of the hospital petitions the district court of the jurisdiction in which the hospi
tal is located for their extended involuntary commitment. Id. § 12(d). Once the peti
tion is filed, a hearing must be held within fourteen days. Id. § 7(c).
2. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188.
3.

lei.

4. For a discussion of the elements of proof to which the standard is applied,
see text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
5. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188.
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sion of the District Court reversed, finding prejudicial error in the
trial judge's denial of the requested ruling on the standard of
proof. 6 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Walsh reasoned that
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in In re Andrews 7 con
trolled, and required the use of the reasonable doubt standard.
The hospital appealed, claiming that despite the Andrews deci
sion the clear and convincing standard was still constitutional for
civil commitment proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court af
firmed the decision of the Appellate Division. 8 It held that loss of
fi'eedom, and the stigma associated with civil commitment require
use of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The Hagberg
decision has added Massachusetts to the growing number of juris
dictions 9 which have adopted the criminal standard of proof as an
important procedural safeguard to which persons subject to peti
tions for civil commitment are constitutionally entitled. The deci
sion accurately reflects the major substantive and procedural
changes that have occurred in mental health law over the last de
cade in Massachusetts and in most ~ther states.

II.

BACKGROUND

Under Massachusetts law 10 there are three major categories of
persons who may appear before the court as responde.nts in mental
health commitment hearings. First are criminal defendants who
have been found incompetent to stand trial. l1 Second are those
who may be found "not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental
defect" (the insanity-acquitted).12 The third are persons such as
Mrs. Hagberg whose commitment hearings do not directly derive
from an alleged criminal offense. Commitments of those in the first
6. Myerson v. Hagberg, 1975 Mass. App. Dec. Adv·. Sh. 506.
7. 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2550, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975). This decision required the
use of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in proceedings under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A (West 1969). It also
held that the fourteenth amendment requires that "any significant procedural rights
granted to persons involuntarily committed under c. 123 must be extended to per
sons involuntarily committed under c. 123A § 6...." 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2558, 334
N.E.2d at 22-23. See notes 127-41 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the equal protection implications of this holding for civil commitment proceedings.
8. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187.
9. See note 62 illfra.
10. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 (West 1969).
11. [d. § 16 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). This does not include prisoners in a
penal institution whose transfer to a mental health facility is sought pursuant to sec
tion 18. The process for the determination of incompetency to stand trial is also a
separate procedure. [d. § 15.
12. [d. § 16.
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two categories are referred to as "criminal" and commitments of
those in the third category as "civil. "13
Two principal rationales have traditionally served as theoretical
bases of the state's power to civilly commit and confine certain in
dividuals. First is the common law parens patriae doctrine under
which the state has the power to protect its citizens who are
deemed incapable of making a rational decision to seek the care
they need. 14 Second is the police power authority which arises
from the inherent right of any government to make laws for the
protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. 15
In recent years, a growing number of courts have recognized
that parens patriae commitments, which allow a person to be con
fined without any showing of dangerousness to self or others, vio
late due process because they deprive an individual of liberty with
out serving a compelling state interest. 16 State legislatures have
also recognize~ the constitutional limits of parens patriae commit
ments. The Massachusetts legislature, taking notice of the due pro
cess issues involved, 17 was among the first to largely eliminate the
parens patriae rationale from its commitment scheme. 1s Under the
present law, before any individual can be committed the court
13. Id. §8. Only those who are patients in a mental health facility may be
petitioned against for civil commitment. Id. §§ 6-8. Those persons may have been
confined pursuant to a previous order of commitment or pursuant to an emergency
commitment under section 12, or may have entered the hospital voluntarily.
14. E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). The first application in Massachusetts came in In re
Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845) (insane person adjudged to be in need of treat
ment may be institutionalized).
15. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
16. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1976);
prior judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); cf. Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d
615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, (statute authorizing temporary commitment of "mentally ill"
persons without preadmission or automatic postadmission judicial hearing held not to
violate due process requirements), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
17. See McLaughlin v. Herbert, 51 Mass. App. Dec. 12, 18-19 (1973).
18. Before the major revision of the civil commitment statute, the Massa
chusetts statute provided for commitment of individuals found to be "in need of care
or treatment," a classic parens patriae standard. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1
(West 1958). Elements of this rationale may still be found in the third definition of
likelihood of serious harm. See note 20 illfra. Even under that definition, however,
the focus is on the likelihood that serious harm will result from inability to care for
oneself, rather than on the need for treatment.
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must be persuaded that she is mentally ill,19 and that her discharge
from a mental health facility would create a likelihood of serious
harm. 20
The opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court only considered
the implications of the new statute indirectly, by reference to the
In re Andrews 21 opinion. The statutory provisions for a very strin
gent standard of commitment and a number of basic substantive
and procedural safeguards,22 however, support the court's view
that a stringent standard of proof is required. The revised statute
takes the "legal" rather than the "medical" approach to civil com
mitment. 23 This choice "reflects the anti-confinement bias" of the
legal system which requires that for commitment there must be a
real danger to society sufficient to overcome our "traditional norm
that when in doubt, an individual should not be imprisoned. "24
The "legal" approach to civil commitment, with its "anti-con
finement bias," does not represent a decision to abandon mentally
ill persons in need of care and treatment to fend for themselves in

19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). The term,
"mental illness" was not defined by the legislature. Rather, section 2 of the statute
requires the Department of Mental Health to supply the definition. The department
has defined mental illness as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recog
nize reality or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life." MASS. ADMIN. REGS. ON
MENTAL HEALTH, Tit. IV, Code of Human Services Regulations § 200.01 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as REGULATIONS].
20. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). Likelihood
of serious harm is defined as:
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by
evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm; (2) a
substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence
of homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3)
a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person himself
as manifested by evidence that such person's judgment is so affected that he
is unable to protect himself in the community and that reasonable provision
for his protection is not available in the community.
Id. § 1.
21. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 193-94. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 40-51 illfra and accompanying text.
23. The "legal" viewpoint, of which the Massachusetts statute is a model, urges
that objective standards for commitment (proof of dangerousness as evidenced by
past conduct) are constitutionally required, since the purpose of civil commitment is
to protect society from harmful conduct. The "medical" viewpoint, on the other
hand, urges that individuals in appropriate cases may be committed for purposes of
treatment and cure. See Shane, The Stalldard of Proof ;11 Illvollllltaru Civil Com
mitmellt Proceedillgs, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 209, 210-13.
24. Id.at211.
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a hostile world. Rather, it grows out of a realization that the nature
of mental hospitals and the lasting effects of civil commitment make
involuntary hospitalization poorly adapted to the official goal of
helping mentally ill persons regain the ability to "recognize reality
[and] to meet the ordinary demands of life. "25
A.

Effects of Civil COl1unitment

State mental hospitals are total institutions. While they may
help some individuals, by their nature they cannot restore or im
prove the ability of many mentally ill persons to function in soci
ety.26 Most patients spend one boring day after another on barren
wards, often medicated with psychotropic drugs. They are typically

25. REGULATIONS, supra note 19, § 200.01. While the Massachusetts legisla
ture has designed the civil commitment statute largely for the protection of society, it
has enacted other programs which are specifically designed to meet the pressing
problems of mental illness. For example, MASS. CEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19 (West 1973)
requires the state to establish and maintain a comprehensive program of mental
health and mental retardation services in the community.
26. E. COFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) described total institutions as those in which
all aspects of life are conducted in the same location and under the same authority.
Inmates follow a rigid schedule prescribed by the authorities. Before the authorities
will discharge an inmate, she or he must apparently have adapted to the institution
and embraced its values. Since this demands that the inmate relinquish individuaJ
identity and self-sufficiency, survival on the outside, not to mention success, is
jeopardized. As Coffman explained:
In response to his stigmatization and to the sensed deprivation that occurs
when he enters the hospital, the inmate frequently develops some alienation
from civil society.... [Tlhis alienation can develop regardless of the type of
disorder for which the patient was committed, constituting a side effect of
hospitalization that frequently has more significance for the patient and his
personal circle than do his original difficulties.
Id. at 355-56. Many other commentators have described the "overwhelming sense of
powerlessness which invades the individual as he is continually exposed to the de
personalization of the psychiatric hospital." Rosenhan, all Beillg Salle ill Illsalle
Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379, 394-95 (1973). See also, Ferleger, Loosing the
Chaills: Ill-Hospital Civil Liberties of Melltal Patiellts, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447
(1973); Katz, The Right to Treatment: An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 755 (1969); Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Re
habilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 616
(1972). For graphic inside views of two of these total institutions by federal courts,
see New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd in parl sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Any
length hospitalization may greatly increase the symptoms of mental illness and make
adjustment to society more difficult. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCO~IM. ON CON
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91st Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 214-15, 319, 409 (1969-1970).
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supervised by an inadequately trained staff27 which administers a
fairly rigid system of institutional discipline. For antisocial or dif
ficult behavior~ patients may be subjected to loss of privileges, se
clusion and restraints (physical or chemical), room searches, and in
some cases transfer to maximum security wards or institutions. 28
Hospitalization involves an almost total loss of physical lib
erty.29 Confinement also deprives the patient of other vital con
stitutional rights, including the rights of privacy,30 association, and
travel. 31 While Massachusetts provides more statutory protec
tion of the in-hospital civil liberties of patients than most jurisdic
tions,32 the basic nature and effects of the confinement remam un
changed. 33
27. See Ferleger, supra note 26. Patients have the bulk of their contact with
ward staff which routinely makes decisions that deeply affect the status and condi
tion of the patient. At the best a patient's daily experience is "the regimented routine
of ward life and daily confrontation with state employees, however capable, rather
than family or friends." In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citation
omitted). In state institutions, staff are so overburdened with providing basic custo
dial care that they view themselves as unable to attend to the psychotherapeutic
aspects of hospitalization. Interview with Dr. Barry J. Nigrosh, Director, Staff Train
ing, Northampton State Hospital, Northampton, Massachusetts (September 15, 1977).
28. Hospital conditions jeopardize physical as well as mental health:
Data compiled in 1966 indicate that while the death rate per 1000 persons
in the general population in the United States each year is only 9.5, the rate
among resident mental patients is 91.8. . . . Although part of this difference
may be accounted for by a larger number of older persons in mental institu
tions, studies indicate that other factors [such as low physician/patient
ratio] also are involved.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
29. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975), is a clear statement by the Supreme Court of every individual's right
to liberty under the United States Constitution. In many jurisdictions the right to
liberty may be clearer under state constitutions than it is under the United States
Constitution. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitmellt of the Melltally Ill: Prac
tical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1157 (1972).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. The rights of association and travel protect travel across the street as well as
to China, the right to meet with friends as well as the right to join a labor union. See
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J. concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78); REGULA
TIONS, supra note 19, §§ 221.01-.13. For comparison, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDA
TION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW ch. 5 (rev. ed. 1971).
33. The following rights of a patient may be denied or restricted by hospital
authorities:
1. The right to consellt to or refuse medicatioll. The Civil Commitment Stat
ute requires consent only for shock treatment or lobotomy. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). The regulations provide
that: "upon admission to a facility for care and treatment, a person shall re
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After the patient leaves the hospital, he or she faces an uphill
struggle. The stigma associated with the label "mentally ill and
dangerous" has been well-documented. 34 The label, in the view of
many doctors and lay people, is permanent. 35 The personal36 and
ceive treatment and rehabilitation in accordance with accepted therapeutic
practice, including oral, subcutaneous and intramuscular medication when
appropriate and when ordered by a physician." REGULATIONS, supra note
19, § 220.02.
2. The right to manage and spend one's own money. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78) only permits the individual "to keep
and be allowed to spend a reasonable sum of his own money for canteen ex
penses and small purchases." This precise language has been incorporated
into the departmental regulations. REGULATIONS, supra note 19, § 221.07(e).
3. The right to entertain visitors. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-78), and REGULATIONS, supra note 19, § 221.07(d) pro
vide for the prohibition of visits by certain persons upon a determination that
such a visit would not be in the patient's best interests.
4. The right to communicate with the outside world by telephone and mail.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), and REGU
LATIONS, supra note 19, § 221.07(b) & (e) provide for the restriction of mail
and phone privileges under certain circumstances.
34. Rosenhan, supra note 26, at 385 n.ll; Developments in the Law: Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1200-01 (1974). The bulk of
the relevant literature suggests that" [a)t best, an enlightened minority has been per
suaded to accept" a sympathetic view towards the mentally ill. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d
648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, e.g., C. CROCHETTI, STIGMA, PREJUDICE AND MENTAL
ILLNESS (1972); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 45-178 (1972); Crumpton,
Weinstein, Acker and Ennis, How Patients and Normals View the Mental Patient, 23
J. OF CLINICAL PSYCH. 46 (1967); Maisel, The Ex-Mental Patient and Rehospitaliza
tion: Some Research Findings, 15 Soc. PROB. 18 (1967); Page, Stenant and Susan,
"What is Psychiatric Stigma?" 34 PSYCH. REP. 360 (1974); Rossman and Midder, The
Effects of Social Prejudice on Hospitalized Adolescents, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 1029
(1973); Sarbin and Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitude of the Public
Towards Mental Health, 35 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970); Swan
son and Spitzer, Stigma and the Psychiatric Patient's Career, II J. OF HEALTH AND
SOC. BEHAVIOR 44 (1970). In Hagberg, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
stated only that mental illness "does not carry the same stigma it once did, but we
are not prepared to say that the stigma has entirely disappeared." 1978 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 193. It did not address the argument made by amicus that since civil commit
ment involves an adjudication of dangerousness as well as mental illness, the as
sociated stigma is much greater than that associated with the label "mental illness"
alone. Brief for amicus curiae Mental Patients Advocacy Project, Myerson v. Hag
berg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, at 33-35. See text accompanying notes 139-41 infra.
35. See Rosenhan, supra note 26. Dr. Rosenhan conducted an experiment in
which twelve sane individuals feigned symptoms of mental illness to gain admission
to mental hospitals. These individuals thereafter acted entirely normal insofar as pos
sible under the circumstances. Eleven, diagnosed as schizophrenics, were later dis
charged with a diagnosis of "schizophrenia in remission."
36. Dr. Rosenhan has observed that:
A psychiatric label has a life and an influence of its own. Once the im
pression has been formed that the patient is schizophrenic, the expectation is
that he will continue to be schizophrenic. When a sufficient amount of time
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practical effects of such a handicap, as a number of courts have
noted,37 can be devastating. A Massachusetts jurist noted for his
involvement with mental health law has summarized the disabilities
that accompany a record of commitment:
Apart from social stigma, the record of court-ordered involuntary
commitment hardens the obstacles faced by any former mental
patient in obtaining employment, higher education, professional
status and publicly authorized licenses. This type of record also
heightens the likelihood of prejudice to the person in his role as
a party, witness or potential juror in a court proceeding, not to
mention the likelihood of prejudice to his position as a respon
dent in a subsequent mental health commitment proceeding. 38

A well-known mental health attorney has testified that "[i]n the job
market, it is better to be an ex-felon than ex-patient."39

B.

Procedural and Substantive Safeguards

Awareness of the nature and effects of hospitalization has re
cently sparked widespread legal concern about the conduct of the
civil commitment process. 40 In Massachusetts, the revised statute
accords commitment defendants a number of important procedural
and substantive safeguards. 41 The most basic is an adversary hearhas passed, during which the patient has done nothing bizarre, he is consid
ered to be in remission and available for discharge. But the label endures
beyond discharge, with the unconfirmed expectation that he will behave as a
schizophrenic again. Such labels, conferred by mental health professionals,
are as influential on the patient as they are on his relatives and friends, and
it should not surprise anyone that the diagnosis acts on all of them as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Eventually, the patient himself accepts the diag
nosis, with all of its surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves accord
ingly.
[d. at 389 (citation omitted).
37. E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
38. deMarneffe v. Anonymous, No. 8062 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. Northern
Dist. Dec. 30, 1974) at 2. The opinion was written by Franklin Flaschner, late Chief
Judge of the Massachusetts District Courts. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
39. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (quoting
statement of Bruce Ennis).
40. See Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the
Courtroom, 11 L. & SOC'Y REV. 651, 665-66 (1977). See also Developments in the
Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
41. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, §§ 5-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
When the statute is silent, as it is on the standard of proof, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment must be used to fill the gaps. While the Supreme Court
has not directly ruled on the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to civil
commitment proceedings, it has indicated that any proceeding which might end' in
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ing,42 preceded by notice,43 in which the state must prove the
elements of its case. 44 Absent such a hearing, an individual may be
confined for only a limited time. 45 The defendant has a statutory
right to be represented by counsel,46 to receive an independent
medical examination,47 and to present independent testimony. He
or she probably also has a right to be present at his or her own
hearing. 48 A first order of commitment expires after six months;
subsequent orders remain in effect for one year. 49 Before a new
commitment order will be issued a full hearing must again be held
in which the burden of proof remains on the state. After Hagberg,
of course, the state will have to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Recent Massachusetts decisions have guaranteed commitment
defendants the right to have the hospital authorities search for less
restrictive alternatives to hospitalization. Only if no such alterna
tives are found may involuntary commitment be ordered. 50 The
deprivation of liberty must satisfy due process standards, even if denominated
"civil." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst.,
407 U.S. 245 (1972). For a discussion of the due process clause and the standard of
proof, see text accompanying notes 93-141 infra.
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 5-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
43. Id. § 7(c).
44. See notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text.
45. The statute provides for emergency detention fm a maximum of ten days
after which a petition for extended involuntary commitment must be filed. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). See note 1 supra.
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). The in
dividual has a right to be visited by his attorney at all reasonable times. Id. § 23.
One commentator, however, has called the right to counsel in civil commitment
cases "largely an empty one. . . ." Monahan, Empirical Analyses of Civil Commit
ment: Critique and Context, 11 L. & SOC'Y REv. 619, 623 (1977). See notes 124-26
infra and accompanying text.
47. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
48. Schwartz and Stern, A Trial Manual for Civil Commitment (Mental Health
Legal Advisor's Committee) II 19-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Manual].
49. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
50. The least restrictive alternative principle appears in the final phrase of
the third definition of likelihood of serious harm. [d. § 1. See note 20 supra. In addi
tion, the periodic review section requires a "consideration of all possible alternatives
to continued hospitalization or residential care including, but not necessarily limited
to, a determination of the person's relationship to the community and to his family,
or hi's employment possibilities, and of available community resources, foster care
and convalescent facilities." Id. § 4. In deMarnefTe v. Anonymous, No. 8062 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. App. Div. Northern Dist. Dec. 30, 1974), Judge Flaschner noted that the
policy expressed in sections one and four of the statute "is consistent with the de
velopment of a new constitutional right of all committed persons, that is, the right to
be deprived of one's liberty only under circumstances representing the least restric
tive alternative for each individual consistent with the needs for his treatment and
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alternative disposition might be a nursing home or a halfWay house
that provides sufficient care and supervision, or it might simply be
a requirement that the individual carry some type of identification
that will alert the authorities in case he becomes lost or dis
oriented. 51
The choice of the appropriate standard of proof must necessar
ily be influenced by these developments. In recognition of its
police rather than medical function, the use of the involuntary
commitment process has been restricted by the adoption of more
stringent statutory safeguards, by the least restrictive alternative
doctrine, and by the limitations imposed on parens patriae com
mitments. Only those persons who demonstrably pose a substantial
danger to society and who cannot be cared for in any other way
may be confined.
III.

STANDARDS OF PROOF

In commitment hearings there are at least three elements 52
that the state must prove before the defendant can be committed:
That the individual is mentally ill,53 that his or her release would
pose a likelihood of serious harm,54 and that no appropriate less

security." Id. at 12-13. In addition, he expressly held that proof of lack of alternatives
was a condition precedent to commitments pursuant to the third definition of likeli
hood of serious harm. 1d. at 13.
Following the lead of deMarneffe, the Appellate Division in Gallup v. Alden,
1976 Mass. App. Div. Adv. Sh. 113, 133-36, held that since this constitutional protec
tion was extended to persons committed under the third definition of likelihood of
serious harm, equal protection requires that it be extended to other categories of
commitment defendants. Since a deprivation of fundamental rights is involved, the
state would have to show a compelling reason to distinguish between categories;
such a showing has not been made. Thus all defendants in civil commitment pro
ceedings are entitled under the statute and' the fourteenth amendment to a less re
strictive disposition than hospitalization if one is appropriate and available. See note
91 infra.
51. These suggestions were made by Judge David Bazelon in the landmark
case of Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661, n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a thorough dis
cussion of the application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to mental health
commitments, see Chambers supra note 29.
52. In addition, at least in police power commitments in which treatment is the
quid pro quo of confinement, it has been argued that the hospital should be required
to prove that there is some chance of improving the defendant's mental condition
through treatment provided at the hospital. Manual, supra note 48, at VI 17-25.
Since the rationale of the third definition of likelihood of serious harm, under which
Mrs. Hagberg was committed, is arguably custody and care, the possibility of treat
ment would not necessarily be a required element of proof in her case.
53. See note 19 supra.
54. See note 20 supra.
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restrictive alternatives to hospitalization are available for that indi
vidual. 55 Massachusetts decisions, like· those in other jurisdic
tions,56 have assumed that the same standard, be it preponderance
of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, should be applied to each element of the state's
case.
Courts and commentators generally agree on the definitions of
preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Preponderance of the evidence simply means "more likely
than not. "57 This standard is still used in civil commitment pro
ceedings in several jurisdictions. 58 It was widely used by Mas
sachusetts courts for commitment hearings until 1974. 59 Thus, until
that date an individual could be committed if the factfinder was
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was
in need of care or treatment. 60 There is also little disagreement as
to the meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard which is
required either by statute 61 or judicial decision 62 to be used in
commitment proceedings in a growing number of jurisdictions. It is
generally accepted to mean "belief to a moral certainty. "63
55. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
56. In every case reviewed for this article, the court applied the same standard
of proof to every element.
57. Smith v. Rapid Transit Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945); Sargent v.
Mass. Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940); 32A C.J.S. Evidence
§ 1021 (1964). See McBaine, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV.
242, 246-52 (1944).
58. See Shane, supra note 23, at 257.
59. In 1974 the influential holding in deMarneffe v. Anonymous, No. 8062
(Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. Northern Dist. Dec. 30, 1974), written by Chief Judge
Franklin Flaschner, persuaded most district courts to adopt the "clear and convinc
ing" standard which, until Hagberg, was generally used throughout Massachusetts.
60. See note 18 supra.
61. See Shane, supra note 23, at 258.
62. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F.
Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974); In re Hodges, 325 A.2d 605 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974); Proctor v.
Butler, 1977 N.H. Adv. Sh.; Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964);
Lausche v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975); Ex parte Perry, 137 N.J. Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885 (1945);
State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59,545 P.2d 97 (1976).
63. Massachusetts still relies on Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
295 (1850):
[Reasonable doubt] is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating
to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possi
ble or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors
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Courts presiding over civil commitment hearings, however,
have been unable to agree on the meaning of the clear and con
vincing standard used in most Massachusetts commitment proceed
ings before Hagberg. 64 Explicitly accepting Wigmore's position that
it is an intermediate standard, stricter than a preponderance of the
evidence but not as strict as the criminal standard, the United
States Supreme Court has on occasion required the use of a stan
dard of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence."65 Lower civil
commitment courts have nevertheless ascribed different meanings
to the clear and convincing standard. Washington courts, for exam
ple, have characterized the standard as "a very high standard of
proof . . . the civil counterpart of the criminal reasonable doubt
standard" when it is used in commitment hearings. 66 On the other
hand, the Texas Supreme Court has equated "clear and convinc
ing" with the preponderance of the evidence standard. 67 When
used in a temporary (up to 90 day) commitment proceeding it only
requires that "the necessity for involuntary hospitalization . . . be
reasonably clear."68 A number of federal decisions apply an am
biguous "clear and convincing" standard in commitment cases that
in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.... [T]he evidence must establish
the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judg
ment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
Id. at 320 (Shaw, C.].). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gerald, 356 Mass. 386, 252
N.E.2d 344 (1969), cerl. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1974). See generally 23A C.].S. Crimi
nal Law § 1267 (1961).
64. See note 59 supra.
65. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 282 n.9
(1966) (deportation proceeding), citing 9]. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2497 (3d ed. 1940)
(followed in In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973)}. See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
66. In re Levias, 517 P.2d 588, 590 (Wash. 1973).
Carrying a much greater and much stricter burden of proof than a mere pre
ponderance of the evidence [citations omitted], the clear, cogent and con
vincing test applicable in mental illness proceedings exacts the duty that
every element essential to proving commitable mental illness be dem
onstrated to a degree essentially corresponding to that necessary for com
mitment in criminal proceedings.
However, the Levias opinion also suggests that precisely the same test ("clear, co
gent and convincing") may be used, but with a different and far less demanding
content, in extraordinary civil proceedings which do not result in deprivation of lib
erty (e.g., constructive trust). Id. at 590 n.1.
67. "The requirement of clear and convincing evidence is merely another
method of stating that a cause of action must be supported by factually sufficient
evidence." Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1975).
68. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 943 (Tex. 1976).
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requires "the highest degree of certitude reasonably attainable in
view of the nature of the matter at issue."69
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which before Hag
berg had not ruled on the standard of proof in civil commitments,
has often criticized the clear and convincing standard in other con
texts, viewing it as "too vague to serve generally as a practical
guide in the trial of cases. "70 In Hagberg, the court reviewed its
use of the standard.71 It concluded that clear and convincing proof
is an intermediate test which requires that the probability that the
facts in dispute are true be "substantially greater" than the proba
bility that they are false. 72 In rejecting this standard, the court
expressly avoided making a "precise calibration of freedom or
stigma." It simply could not see any reason for using "three stan
dards of proof when two seem quite enough. "73
The court's opinion did not consider the reasoning that led
District Court Chief Judge Franklin Flaschner, in the well-known
case of deMarneffe v. Anonynwus,74 to adopt the clear and con
vincing standard in civil commitment proceedings only four years
earlier. Judge Flaschner, despite his long-time advocacy of reform
in the mental health system, feared that use of the criminal stan
dard would tilt the scales too far in favor of the defendant. Reason
able doubts would simply be too easy to come by.75 In contrast to
69. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974). Accord, Dixon v.
Attorney Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). The problem with this
approach is thai' it would permit commitment even when the factfinder believes that
there is less than an even chance that the commitment standards have been satisfied,
if that is the "highest degree of certitude" that medical science (according to expert
testimony) can achieve.
70. Matter of Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 167,3 N.E.2d 248, 253 (1936), approved
in Dep't of Public Health v. Cumberland Cattle Co., 361 Mass. 817, 830, 282 N.E.2d
895,904 (1972).
71. In 1974 the United States Supreme Court had directed that the clear and
convincing standard is constitutionally required for proof of actual malice in defama
tion cases involVing public figures. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352
(1974). The Supreme Judicial Court has grudgingly applied that standard in Callahan
v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 363 N.E.2d 240 (1977);
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1704,330 N.E.2d 161 (1975).
72. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 193.
73. Id. See notes 127-41 infra and accompanying text.
74. No. 8062 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. Northern Dist. Dec. 30, 1974). See
notes 38 & 59 supra.
75. Id. at 18. Having determined that the reasonable doubt stan:dard should not
be used, Judge Flaschner thought it appropriate to apply the clear and convincing
standard in civil commitment proceedings precisely because the Supreme Judicial
Court had rejected it in other contexts. Since the standard was not used in other civil
cases in which the stakes were lower, it could be given a stringent definition and
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other courts, which have considered the matter in depth,76 the
Hagberg court stated only that it found "unpersuasive expressions of
doubt whether such proof is feasible. "77
A.

Importance of the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof

The adoption of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in commit
ment proceedings is more than just a change in vocabulary. Use of
the criminal standard should affect the treatment that the asser
reserved entirely for use in commitment hearings. Id. at 22. This would enable Mas
sachusetts to abide by the spirit of the Supreme Court's admonition that "a person
accused of a crime ... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting
to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for
years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case." In re Win
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 197, 205,299
N.Y.S.2d 414,422,247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (1969)). In view of the recent use of the clear
and convincing standard by the Supreme Judicial Court in libel actions, see note 71
supra, Judge Flaschner's logic, if not his conclusion, squares with the holding in
Hagberg.
76. E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 194. Experience in other areas of the law dem
onstrates that both mental illness and likelihood of serious harm can be determined
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of mental state beyond a reasonable doubt is com
monly required in criminal trials, in which the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had the requisite mens rea when the criminal act occurred.
More specifically, when a defendant places her sanity in issue through the insanity
defense, Massachusetts requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was sane when the crime was committed. Chin Kee v. Common
wealth, 354 Mass. 156,235 N.E.2d 787 (1968); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass.
544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967). In such cases, as in commitment hearings, the bulk of
the evidence presented on mental state takes the form of expert psychiatric tes
timony. The factfinder evaluates that testimony, and may reject some or all of.it. Id.;
Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 258 N.E.2d 13 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969). It is Significant that in criminal pro
ceedings the Commonwealth requires twelve jurors to agree "beyond a reasonable
doubt" about the defendant's sanity. Experience in Sexually Dangerous Person pro
ceedings in Massachusetts since In re Andrews, shows that a single judge is able to
reach the same degree of certainty. Commonwealth v. Lamb, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305,
310,360 N.E.2d 307, 312 (1977).
The present state of psychiatric knowledge makes it impossible to predict that a
person will "beyond a reasonable doubt" commit a dangerous or harmful act. See
notes 115-23 infra and accompanying text. Such a prediction, however, is not re
quired before a defendant may be committed under chapter 123. The probability of
dangerousness required for commitment is specified in the statute as a "substantial"
or "very substantial" risk of harm. The standard of proof is distinct from these sub
stantive standards for commitment. It only defines the degree to which the judge
must be certain that there is a "substantial" risk of harm.
In Hagberg, the Supreme Judicial Court stressed that the standard was success
fully in use elsewhere for proof of mental illness and dangerousness. 1978 Mass.
Adv. Sh. at 194. See note 62 supra. For a discussion of proof of the absence of a less
restrictive alternative, see notes 88-92 infra and accompanying text.
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tedly mentally ill and dangerous receive from the legal system in at
least three important ways.
First, it is clear that as the standard of proof is raised, the
chance that defendants will be wrongfully committed, at least in
some close cases, will decrease. Undoubtedly, the outcome of the
majority of commitment hearings does not tum on the standard of
proof employed. 78 But considering the catastrophic effects that a
mistaken commitment can have on a person's life, this effect is im
portant, even if it could be shown that the outcome of but a few
hearings a year would be affected. As the Honorable Alexander
Holtzoff testified before the United States Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights:
We feel strongly that there is a necessity for protecting the
constitutional rights of persons who are mentally ill in order to
prevent an occasional unjust commitment or, to use a colloquial
ism, an occasional railroading. Such cases are rare, but there is
always the danger of their occurring. And, after all, the necessity

for any constitutional rights is to prevent a miscarriage of justice
in the exceptional case. 79

The clear and convincing standard was so imprecise 80 that it was
difficult to know whether the factfinder was actually applying a re
laxed standard, close or equal to a preponderance of the evidence.
In cases in which the court may be especially likely to inadver
tently shape the facts to satisfY the statutory criteria, as when vio
lent acts on the part of the defendant have been introduced into
evidence, insistence on procedural safeguards is vital. 81
Second, use of the reasonable doubt standard will affect the
attitudes of those involved in the legal system as well as the popu
lation at large towards the mentally ill. As the Supreme Court ob
served in an analogous context in which individual liberty was also
at stake:
78. This is illustrated by Mrs. Hagberg's case itself. When the hearing on the
hospital's petition for continued commitment finally was held in October, 1976, be
fore the reversal by the Appellate Division of the original order of commitment, the
judge did not commit despite the fact that the clear and convincing standard was still
in use. Brief for Amicus Mental Patients Advocacy Project at 23, Superintendent of
Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187.
79. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 664 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting HEARINGS ON
S. 935 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RiGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 182 (1969)).
80. See notes 64-73 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Manual, supra note 48, at I 21.
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[T]he reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important
in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder
of his guilt with utmost certainty. 82

Adoption of the criminal standard in Massachusetts will encourage
members of the bar to abandon the view of the mentally ill em
bodied in the older statute 83 and practice under which indefinite
commitment without proof of dangerousness was permitted and
procedural protections accorded defendants were minimal. Judges
as well as lawyers need this instruction, especially those whose ex
perience is principally unc;ler the old law. Some judges more than
others tend to employ an "equitable balancing test" in which com
munity pressure and fears as much as the statutory standards may
be determinative as the court attempts to weigh the "interests of
society" against the interests of the defendant. 84 The hazard of em
ploying this "balancing test" is that although the issues may be
framed in terms of the statutory dangerousness standard, the trig
gering concern may be that the allegedly mentally ill person is a
troubling nuisance. 85
Like many other individuals, [the mentally ill] generate family
crises, disrupt classrooms in schools, generate tension in
employment units, or pester and sometimes frighten pedestrians.
Their activities touch raw nerves, and sometimes their antics are
exhausting physically and emotionally, eliciting sharp and bitter
reactions. The modem family, school, occupational setting, and
neighborhood are so functionally specialized that the standards
82. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
83. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 (West 1969). See notes 18 & 60 supra and
accompanying text.
84. Manual, supra note 48, at I 21.
85. Friedman and Daly, Civil Commitment and the Doctrine of Balance: A
Critical Analysis, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 503, 514 (1973). The authors argue persua
sively that since mental illness per se is not indicative of dangerousness, and since
the impact of mental illness is most often limited to private or interpersonal difficul
ties, even the police power rationale cannot justify confinement of the mentally ill.
The United States has one of the world's highest rates of violent crime, most of them
perpetrated by those not classified as "mentally ill." Yet the mentally ill are the only
category of potential offenders for whom preventive detention is accepted as a matter
of course.
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for correct social conduct and role performance are very de
tailed, specific and inflexible. Inefficiency, lack of discipline,
nonproductivity, and other forms of deviance are poorly toler
ated. It is against these rigid contexts that "mental illness" or
"need for retention" or "dangerousness" are tested. Commit
ment, rather than protecting society from the dangerous, merely
enforces conformity to socially accepted roles. 86

The attitudes of judges and lawyers, and in a basic way those of the
community, largely determine whether the commitment process
will be used to confine individuals who are not mentally ill and
dangerous. 87 The effect of the reasonable doubt standard on those
attitudes will be an important, although difficult to measure, effect
of Hagberg.
A third potential effect of the use of the reasonable doubt
standard is that it can underscore the defendant's "new constitu
tional right" to be confined in a less restrictive alternative than the
hospital, if one can be found. 88 At Northampton State Hospital, for
example, staff members have estimated that at least a majority of
the patients do not require continued hospitalization, although they
do require some degree of care and supervision. 89 Unquestionably,
the underlying problem is that the state has failed to provide
enough alternative facilities despite its constitutional and statutory
obligation to do SO.90 Thus, many patients simply cannot be placed
outside the hospital. 91
The adoption of a more rigorous standard of proof cannot direct
ly remedy this situation, since courts require the petitioner to show
86. Id. at 514-15.
87. See notes 19-20 supra.
88. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
89. Interview with B. Nigrosh supra note 27. More than a quarter of the pa
tients at the hospital are mentally retarded; most of these individuals are not even
primarily diagnosed as mentally ill, and certainly no suitable treatment is provided
for them at the hospital. Almost all of these patients were transferred from the Bel
chertown, Massachusetts State School following a 1970 federal lawsuit challenging
conditions there. Ricci v. Greenblatt, No. 72-469T (D. Mass. filed Nov. 12, 1973).
90. See note 50 supra.
91. Mrs. Hagberg's situation illustrates the problem. Despite the fact that she is
not under an order of commitment, see note 78 supra, she remained at Worcester
State Hospital in legal limbo because there were no nursing home placements avail
able. Telephone interview with Darragh KasakofT, Mrs. Hagberg's attorney, Seder
and Seder, Worcester, Mass. (September 10, 1977). A number of patients at North
ampton State Hospital have filed a class action suit in federal district court seeking to
enforce their right to less restrictive alternatives than confinement in a total institu
tion. Brewster v. Dukakis, Civ. Act. No. 76-9423-F (D. Mass. filed Dec. 15, 1976).
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only that "no [available] alternative presently exists"92 before com
mitment may be ordered. A higher standard of proof, however, can
provide mental health defendants with a means of insisting that a
very careful search for existing alternatives be made in each case.
This may promote a fuller, more carefully planned use of those
facilities. At the least, requiring the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that no appropriate alternatives exist provides the
defendant with a means of being assured that all available resources
and expertise have been enlisted to make an informed, careful, and
thorough search. The fourteenth amendment requires no less be
fore a person, not accused of any crime, can be involuntarily de
prived of his or her liberty through the civil commitment process.
IV.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Due Process

Determining what process is due in any judicial proceeding93
requires a two-step analysis. First, the rights and interests at stake,
those of the individual involved and the state, must be weighed. 94
Second, the procedures used at the hearing to discover and
evaluate the facts must be measured against due process stan
dards. 95 The Supreme Judicial Court in Hagberg did not focus on
92. Gallup v. Alden, 1976 Mass. App. Div. Adv. Sh. 113, 134. See note 50
supra.
93. Basic due process and equal protection are of course applicable to civil
commitment proceedings. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); McNeil v.
Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The question, as the Supreme Court has
stated, is what process is due. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
94. The Supreme Court has instructed that "the more important the rights at
stake [in any judicial proceeding] the more important must be the procedural
safeguards surrounding those rights." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
Stated another way, the determination of what "procedural protections are due de
pends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss.''' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citation omitted). Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his well known concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368
(1970), urged courts to examine the "comparative social costs of erroneous factual de
terminations" and to adopt a standard of proof that correlates the acceptable risk of
error and the gravity of the judgment at issue. Id. at 370-72 (footnote omitted). When
society is neutral about the outcome of a proceeding, such as in a civil action for dam
ages, a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate. When a fundamental
value determination is made that error in favor of a guilty criminal defendant is vast
ly preferable to error against one who is innocent, a reasonable doubt standard should
be applied.
95. To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a
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the constitutional considerations that led to its decision. Instead, it
relied upon its analysis in In re Andrews 96 to determine which
"procedural protections . . . the particular situation demands. "97
The Andrews court, however, had considered only the interest
weighing prong of the due process analysis. Had the Supreme Ju
dicial Court evaluated the conduct of commitment hearings in
either Andrews or Hagberg, it could also have supported its conclu
sion that the highest standard of proof is required by referring to
the imprecision of the procedures used to find the "facts."
The stakes for persons subject to petitions for civil commit
ment are high indeed: Liberty, livelihood, reputation, and self
esteem. 98 The Supreme Court has held that because these very
interests hang in the balance in juvenile court, procedures used
there must lead to accurate factfinding and reliable decisions. Thus,
the Court expressly required use or-the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof99 in juvenile proceedings. Prior to Hagberg, as
the Supreme Judicial Court noted, a number of courts had already
accepted this rationale and required the use of the criminal stan
dard in civil commitment proceedings. loo Unless there are compel
ling state interests that tip the scales in the other direction, the
interest-balancing test leads to the conclusion that the highest
standard of proof is constitutionally required.
In Hagberg the hospital argued that the state's interest in pro
viding treatment to those who need it, but who have lost the
capacity to make a rational decision regarding their need for care,
constitutes such a consideration. lol This argument, however, mis
construes the purpose of the commitment statute, which was de
signed for a far more limited purpose than providing care for those
in need, even assuming that that is the true motive for the com
lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal rights-depends more often on
how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a
statute or interpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures by
which the facts of the case are detennined assume an importance fully as
great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
96. 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2550, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975). See note 7 supra.
97. 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2550, 334 N.E.2d 15, 25 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
.
98. See notes 26-39 supra and accompanying text.
99. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
100. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 194. See note 62 supra.
101. Brief for Appellant at 19, Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hag
berg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187.
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mitment. The statute permits confinement only of those individuals
who are mentally ill and who pose a likelihood of serious harm.
The type of harm and the degree of risk which a defendant must
be found to present before she can be committed are made very
explicit by the statutory definitions.102 To be sure, the state is in
terested in providing treatment to those in need, but the civil
commitment statute is not the vehicle designed by the legislature
to achieve that end. 103
Because the Massachusetts civil commitment statute is based
on the state's police power,104 the state's interest in a commitment
proceeding, just as in a criminal prosecution, is in accurately iden
tifying those who meet the statutory standards for confinement.
The hospital, representing the state as a kind of "public pros
ecutor,"105 must affirmatively seek to avoid the commitment of
persons who are not mentally ill and who do not pose a likelihood
of serious harm. Just as in the criminal context, this interest is
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free. "106 In civil commitment proceedings, however, accu
racy is difficult to achieve. At the hearing there is a very serious
risk that "false positive" errors will occur; that is, that a person who
does not meet the statutory criteria will nevertheless be commit
ted. Two important reasons for this risk are the reliance by the
factfinder on psychiatric testimony, and the quality of legal rep

102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). See notes
19 & 20 supra.
103. See note 25 supra.
.
104. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
105. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."- ABA, CODE OF PROFES
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-13 (footnote omitted).
106. III re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Even a
showing that occasionally a person is released who does satisfy the statutory criteria
would not alter the application of this fundamental legal principle to the commit
ment situation. "Although there are no doubt costs to society (and possibly even to
the youth himself) in letting a guilty youth go free, I think here, as in criminal cases,
it is far worse to declare an innocent youth a delinquent." [d. at 374.
Returning a guilty criminal or delinquent to society without punishment in
volves the same type of social risks as freeing one who actually poses a likelihood of
serious harm. In both cases, society is exposed to a danger that would have been
avoided by confinement. In criminal and delinquent proceedings the danger results
from the fact that the deterrent effect of the criminal law is weakened by acquitting
guilty persons. When the crime involved is one of violence against persons, the
hazards of release parallel those which result from freeing one who should be com
mitted under the second definition of likelihood of serious harm. See note 20 supra.
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resentation that most persons subject to petitions for civil commit
ment receive.
In Massachusetts, as in all states, the factfinder relies heavily
upon psychiatric testimony for an answer to the legal question of
whether commitment standards have been met. So great is the re
liance that often the medical opinions of the state's expert will be
conclusive in the determination of whether the individual satisfies
the criteria for commitment. 107 Yet, it is hardly disputed that
psychiatric diagnoses of mental illness are unreliable and of ques
tionable validity,108 and that psychiatrists cannot accurately predict
the occurrence of violent or dangerous behavior.
The inability of psychiatrists to accurately diagnose mental dis
orders has been recognized by a number of federal 109 and state llO
courts, including those in Massachusetts.1 11 The basic reasons for
this inability are analytic confusion 112 and a diagnostic process at
107. One New York study, for example, revealed an 87% concurrence rate be
tween psychiatric recommendations and judicial decisions. Steadman, Some Evi
dence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in
Law and Psychiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973). See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1096 n.7 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (defendant committed because court placed
."overwhelming reliance on medical opinion"). The perception of dangerousness is
probably the single most important determinant of judicial decisions to commit or
release. Kumasaka, Stokes, & Gupta, Criteria for Involuntary Hospitalization, 26 AR
CHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 399 (1972).
108. The term "reliability" refers to the degree of agreement among psychia
trists concerning a given diagnosis. The term "validity" refers to a correspondence
between psychiatric diagnosis and the person's actual behavior and symptoms. Ennis
and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
109. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con
curring).
1l0. E.g., People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 2d 306, 325-27, 535 P.2d 352, 365-66, 121
Cal. Rptr. 488, 501-02 (1975).
llI. deMarnefTe v. Anonymous, No. 8062 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. Northern
Dist. Dec. 30, 1974).
112. There is an enormous divergence of opinion among psychiatrists and other
mental health professionals concerning the nature of mental illness. Psychiatry has
simply not yet established recognizable standards of diagnostic evaluation that are
basically accepted in the profession. See, e.g., T. SZASZ, LAw, LIBERTY AND
PSYCHIATRY 12-13 (1963); Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L.
REV. 735 (1973). One commentator has characterized the "present status of classifica
tion of behavior disorders" as "to say the least, chaotic." Zubin, Classification of
Behavioral Disorders, 18 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 373,375-76 (1967). See also Ennis and
Litwack, supra note 108. Researchers measuring diagnostic reliability have discov
ered that the rate of agreement of any three psychiatrists is only 45% as to general
categories of mental illness (for example, psychosis as opposed to neurosis); it drops
to 21% when the doctors attempt a specific diagnosis. Ash, The Reliability of Psychi
atric Diagnosis, 44 J. ABNORMAL SOC. & PSYCH. 272 (1949). See also Beck, Wayne,
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the mercy of many uncontrollable variables. 113 The suggestion has
on occasion been made that inaccuracy justifies a lower standard of
proof. 114 To take this position is to accept that many people will be
hospitalized who under the statute should not be committed, be
cause it is difficult to identify those who should. If the standard of
proof is to properly reflect ability to diagnose mental illness, it
should be lowered, if at all, only as diagnostic precision increases.
Virtually all recent studies point to the conclusion that the
ability of psychiatrists to predict dangerousness is very low. 115 In
Mendelson, Mack, and Gubough, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Study of
Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Ratings, 119 AM. J. PSYCH. 351 (1962); Zu
bin, supra at 373-406.
113. Lack of controls is especially acute in the clinical examination. The sub
ject, place, time, matters discussed, and attitudes and characteristics of the partici
pants will affect different clinicians in different ways. Ennis and Litwack, supra note
108, at 706 n.27. The diagnosis of normal persons who secretly gained admission to
mental hospitals as mentally ill, see note 35 supra, indicates the extent to which
mental health professionals are influenced by the setting of the clinical evaluation.
114. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1165 (4th Cir. 1971); Doremus v. Far
reJl, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516-17 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
393 (M.D. Ala. 1974); deMarneffe v. Anonymous, No. 8062 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.
Northern Dist. Dec. 30, 1974). If the term "mental illness" is so imprecise that the
courts cannot give it a reasonably precise content and identify the mentally ill with
reasonable accuracy, then it may well be unconstitutionally vague as a standard for
confinement. Recognizing this problem, the Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 575 (1975), "assumed" that the term "mental illness" is precise enough to
avoid constitutional difficulties.
115. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions,
23 J. LEGAL ED. 24 (1970); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Ennis and Litwack, supra note 108; Rosenhan, supra
note 26; Roth, Dayley, and Lerner, Into the Abuss: Psuchiatric Reliabilitu and
Emergencu Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400 (1973); Rubin, Predic
tions of Dangerousness in Mentally III Criminals, 27 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH. 397
(1972); Steadman, supra note 107; Steadman and Cocozza, We Can't Predict Who is
Dangerous, PSYCH. TODAY, Ja., 1975 at 32; Steadman and Keveles, The Community
Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients, 1966-1970, 129 AM. J.
PSYCH. 304 (1972); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive
Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972); Wenk, Robin
son, and Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972);
Developments in the Law: Civil COlllmitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190 (1974).
In evaluating these studies it is important to understand that there is virtually no
evidence establishing a link between mental illness and dangerousness. If anything,
data indicate that the reverse is true. Thus, even where mental illness has been
correctly diagnosed, no insight has been gained into the individual's potential for
harm to self or others. For instance, a study of 5,000 patients discharged from New
York State mental hospitals over a five and one half year period showed that" 'pa
tients with no record of prior arrest have a strikingly low rate of arrest after release.
. . . Their overall rate is less than 1/ 12 that of the general population, and the rate for
each separate offense is also far lower, especially for more serious charges.' " In re
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an especially careful effort at prediction, a team of mental health
professionals, including at least two psychiatrists, gave thorough
clinical examinations to individuals who were imprisoned following
conviction for commission of violent crimes. They also reviewed
complete case histories and studied the results of psychological
tests. After this unusually thorough preparation, the team attemp
ted to predict dangerousness. Out of 49 patients predicted to be
dangerous, but nevertheless released, two-thirds had not been
found to have committed a violent crime within five years of re
turning to the community. 116 The procedure followed in this exper
iment favored accuracy; the average psychiatric witness in a com
mitment proceeding has far less information on which to base his
testimony, often only a brief interview with the defendant.
The studies indicate that the result of the inability to accu
rately predict dangerousness is a statistical false positive of enor
mous proportions. One psychiatrist has concluded that even with the
most "careful, painstaking, laborious and lengthy procedures, false
positives may be at a minimum of 60 to 70 per cent. "117 Even the
American Psychiatric Association has recognized that no psychiatric
expertise in this area has been established, and that many people
are erroneously branded as dangerous. lIS
Many reasons have been suggested for the inability of
psychiatrists to predict dangerousness. They include the tendency
of doctors to conform their predictions to their medical judgments
about the advisability of treatment and their assessments of comBallay, 482 F.2d 648, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citations omitted) (quoting 1969 SENATE
HEARINGS, supra note 79, at 277). "Operation Baxtrom" illustrates the lack of correla
tion between mental illness and dangerousness. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), 989 persons who were originally
classified as dangerous enough to be held in maximum security hospitals were trans
ferred to civil hospitals. Out of the 989, only 7 later displayed symptoms that re
quired their return to maximum security institutions. Several years later only 9 of the
group had been convicted of crimes, only two of which were felonies. Twenty-seven
percent were living in the community, while only 3% were in a correctional facil
ity or a hospital for the criminally insane. Hunt and Wiley, Operation Baxtrom After
One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 974 (1968); Steadman and Keveles, supra.
It should be added that all of the studies cited involved attempts to predict vio
lence that may occur over a relatively long time, usually about five years. Accord
ingly, attempts to predict dangerous behavior that will occur in the relatively near
future, within six months to one year, are even less accurate.
116. Kozol, Boucher, and Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Danger
ousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972).
117. Rubin, supra note 115, at 397.
118. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT: CLINICAL
ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-24 (1974).
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munity opinion,119 the context in which the psychiatrist examines
the defendant, the defendant's socio-economic history, 120 and, not
surprisingly, personal bias. 121 The understandable fear of freeing
one who then harms another must discourage doctors from suggest
ing release when they are unsure whether the person is dan
gerous. 122 In such cases, the doctor's errors do not make the
headlines. Underlying all of these considerations is the statistical
problem of trying to predict any form of low base rate behavior
(behavior that is very infrequent in the general population). An ex
cessive number of false positive identifications is an unavoidable
corollary to predictions of low base rate behavior such as violence
towards others and suicide. 123 This statistical problem combines
119. Manual, supra note 48, at I 17-18.
120. Ennis and Litwack, supra note 108, at 724-25.
121. My own conversations with psychiatrists reveal wide differences in
opinion over what sorts of harms justify incarceration. As one would expect,
some psychiatrists are political conservatives while others are liberals; some
place a greater premium on safety, others on liberty. Their opinions about
which harms do, and which do not, justify confinement probably cover the
range of opinions one would expect to encounter in any educated segment
of the public. But they are opinions about matters which each of us is as
qualified to make as they are. Thus, this most fundamental decision-which
harms justify confinement-. . . [is most often made] by an unelected and
unappointed expert operating outside the area of his expertise.
Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife That Cuts Both Ways," 51
JUD. 370, 374 (1968).
122. "No careful judge is likely to assume the responsibility of allowing an
alleged insane person to go free when the sole expert opinion in the record advises
him that such a course is dangerous to the community." DeMarcos v. Overholser,
137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
123. Studies of suicide, an extremely low base rate form of behavior, illustrate
the point. Given a suicide rate of about .0033 among psychiatric inpatients, out of a
hypothetical group of 12,000 such patients, .0033 x 12,000 or 40 individuals will be
truly suicidal. Assuming that diagnosticians developed a method of correctly identify
ing 75% of each group, suicidal and non-suicidal, 30 of the 40 members of the suici
dal group could be correctly identified. However, if 75% of the 11,960 member non
suicidal group were correctly identified as non-suicidal, that means 25% (2,990)
would be incorrectly identified as suicidal. These individuals are the false positives.
If one wished to reduce this large group of false positives, and yet could not exceed
75% accuracy in prediction, it would be necessary to remove people at random from
the combined group of true and false positives. As a result, the number of actually
suicidal people correctly identified would be proportionately reduced. Thus, if one
wished to reduce the false positive on .the non-suicidal group to 10%, which still
leaves 1,200 people incorrectly identified as suicidal, the number of truly suicidal
patients correctly identified would be reduced from 30 to 24. (25% - 10% = 15%;
15% of 40 = 6; 30 - 6 = 24). Steadman, Predicting Dangerousness, RACE, HATE,
ASSAULT AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE 53 (Madden and Lion ed. 1976). When it is
understood that the postulated 75% accuracy rate vastly exceeds our predictive
capacity with regard to dangerous behavior, the statistical reason for the huge false
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with the problems inherent in psychiatric testimony to make the
need for the criminal standard of proof on the issue of dangerous
ness particularly acute.
A second major source of inaccuracy in commitment proceed
ings is the fault of lawyers rather than doctors. Most persons subject
to petitions for civil commitment do not enjoy the benefit of very
competent or aggressive legal representation. 124 A number of studies
suggest that effective representation results in fewer individuals
being committed. 125 This is hardly surprising, since the duties that
a concerned and aggressive attorney can perform are many and var
ied: Explaining the nature of the proceedings to the client and as
certaining his or her wishes; thorough fact investigation including
interviews with doctors and family; negotiating with staff; assisting
in the search for alternatives to hospitalization; vigorous representa
tion at the hearing itself; and the preparation of the client for hos
pitalization if no other disposition can be achieved. So important
are these services that recent cases have found that the due process
clause and the canons of ethics require more in the way of legal
representation than many civil commitment defendants presently
receive. 126 The newly adopted criminal standard of proof cannot
positive becomes clear. It must be remembered, as Dr. Steadman stresses, that the
base rate of dangerous behavior among the mentally ill, contrary to popular prej
udice, is very low. Id. at 65.
124. Because lawyers are distrustful of less than c.ompletely rational minds
and because attorneys, like most persons, are fearful of mental illness, they
are not likely to be aggressive advocates of their clients' interests. Instead,
there is the tendency to defer to the professionalism of the physician. Not
only does this approach produce serious ethical problems for the lawyer, but
it also leaves the person with no effective representation of his interests,
thereby undercutting the entire adversarial process.
Manual, supra note 48, at I 19. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Com
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966), chronicles the poor record
of most attorneys in commitment proceedings. See also Andalman and Chambers,
Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic and A
Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43 (1974); Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Therof,
and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 SW. L.J.
684 (1975); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerg
ing Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974); Comment, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
125. Manual, supra note 48, at 11-22; Gupta, New York's Mental Health In
formation Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 437-38
(1971). Comment, supra note 124, at 1540 n.2. One commentator has stated that "[t]he
attorney who represents the proposed patient and fails to investigate and prepare a
case for presentation at the hearing bears the heaviest responsibility for the ineffec
tiveness of the hearing." Cohen, supra note 124, at 434.
126. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Quesnell v. State,83 Wash. 2d
224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973); Hawks v. Lazarro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1973). The
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improve the level of legal representation, but it can help compen
sate for the cursory care that too many individuals receive from
their attorneys.
In summary, both aspects of the due process inquiry indicate
that the state should be required to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt in civil commitment hearings. First, the indi
vidual has a paramount interest in retaining his or her liberty and
avoiding the stigma and practical burdens of commitment, given
the consequences of institutionalization. Second, the state is· in
terested in confining truly mentally ill and dangerous people, but its
inability to make accurate identifications leads to a very high risk of
erroneous commitment. Few defendants can obtain lawyers whose
knowledge and preparation are equal to these odds. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt will help protect many harmless individuals as
the courts search for the dangerous few.

B.

Equal Protection

In order to meet the requirements of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,127 commitment proceedings
must offer similarly situated persons similar procedural and sub
stantive safeguards. 128 The Supreme Judicial Court, in In re An-

Psychiatric Director of the Court Clinics for the Third District Court, Middlesex
County, has observed in a closely related context:
Too often, in my experience, judges and attorneys have failed to challenge
psychiatric testimony which is either incompetent or clearly erroneous. They
seem to have no reference point or standard by which to evaluate the tes
timony given; no precise knowledge of what a psychiatric examination
should involve, and in what form it should be reported.... [Thislleaves the
courts and attorneys without the means of adequately measuring the quality
of his evaluation.
Jacobs, PS1lchiatric Examination in the Determinatioll of Sexual Dallgerousness ill
Massachusetts, 10 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 85, 86 (1974).
One major shortcoming of many attorneys at commitment hearings is their failure
to object to the improper use of hearsay exceptions, especially the medical records
exception. MASS. GEN. LAWS A..'1N. ch. 233, § 79 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). Sec
tions of the defendant's hospital file contain information on social background, prior
behavior, and private letters, all of which are not properly admissible as medical
history. Yet witnesses frequently read freely from the file without the objection of
defendant's counsel. Mallual, supra note 48, at VI-30. In many cases, the wrongly
admitted evidence is highly prejudicial.
127. For cases in which the Supreme Court has stressed that the equal protec
tion clause applies to both civil and criminal commitments, see note 93 supra.
128. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The equal protection clause per
mits states to make reasonable classifications among persons proposed for commit
ment based on appropriate type of treatment or place of confinement. These distinc
tions, however, do not affect the necessity for substantially similar substantive and
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drews,129 required the use of the reasonable doubt standard for
commitments under the sexually dangerous persons (SDP) statute,
chapter 123A.130 The Hagberg court, relying on the Andrews deci
sion, concluded that defendants in hearings pursuant to the SDP
and civil commitment statutes are similarly situated. 131 The court
reached this conclusion by first evaluating the effects of commit
ment under each statute. Both chapter 123 and chapter 123A au
thorize confinement in state institutions. Moreover, the stigma and
disabilities 132 that result from commitment are in both cases essen
tially the same. Second, the court recognized that "the governmen
tal interest in protecting society from violence from the mentally ill
while they are being treated would be substantially similar to the
interest in protecfing society from the sexually dangerous while
they are being treated. "133
Because the individual's interest in retaining physical liberty is
fundamental, distinctions afforded similarly situated persons pro
posed for commitment must be justified by a compelling state in
terest. 134 The Hagberg court was not persuaded by the hospital's
argument 135 that a compelling interest for different treatment of
SDP and civil commitment defendants could be found in the spe
cial difficulties inherent in proving the elements of a civil commit
ment case. Instead, the court accepted without discussion that the
elements of proof in civil commitment and SDP proceedings are
substantially similar.
Both proceedings require the state's experts to predict future
behavior based on their knowledge of past actions of the type in
tended to be prevented by the commitment. A person may be
found sexually dangerous and committed under chapter 123A
"whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of
power to control his sexual. impulses . . . and who as a result is
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on the objects of his un

procedural safeguards. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966); In re Andrews, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2550, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
129. Id.
130. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A (West 1969). See note 7 supra and ac
companying text.
131. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 191.
132. See notes 26-39 supra and accompanying text.
133. In re Andrews, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2550, 2565,334 N.E.2d 15,22 (1975).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
135. Brief for Appellant at 42-45, Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v.
Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187.
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controlled or uncontrollable desires. "136 The "likely to attack or
otherwise inflict injury" standard parallels the "likelihood of serious
harm"137 that must be proved before a defendant can be civilly
committed. The "misconduct in sexual matters" that must be
proved is equivalent to the statutory requirement that past danger
ous or self-destructive behavior, or threats thereof, must evidence
the asserted likelihood of serious harm. 13S
The court also rejected the hospital's argument 139 that because
a finding of sexual dangerousness involves a more serious stigma
than a finding of mental illness, a lower standard of proof is jus
tified. 140 The hospital's argument did not address the adjudication
of dangerousness which is required for commitment. Much of the
public prejudice against the mentally ill stems from a fear that the
mentally ill will perform violent acts or become uncontrollable.
Thus, a person who has been labelled both mentally ill and dan
gerous is precisely the type of mentally ill person whom the public
fears most.1 4l After Hagberg, equal protection as well as due pro
cess requires the factfinder' to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the label fits before it can be attached.
V.

CONCLUSION

The reasonable doubt standard of proof, adopted in Hagberg,
will help to reduce the chance that an individual who does not
meet the statutory criteria will be committed. Largely because of
the imprecision of psychiatric opinion and the statistical problem of
predicting low base rate behavior, courts cannot determine with
any certainty who is mentally ill and dangerous and who is not.
This inadequacy is especially important in view of the conse
quences of civil commitment: Loss of individual liberty and other
constitutional rights; institutional confinement that may well com
pound the patient's difficulties and impair her ability to live inde
pendently; a disabling and lasting stigma. As a result, it is essential

136. MASS~ GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (West 1969).
137. See note 20 supra.
138. Id.
139. Brief for Appellant at 45-48, Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v.
Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187.
140. For studies detailing the stigma associated with mental illness, see note 34
supra.
141. Investigations of the stigma associated with mental illness have also
documented this point. See note 34 supra.

1978]

STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL COMMITMENT

99

that the highest standard of proof that the law provides be satisfied
before an individual is forced to enter a mental institution.
However important it may be to an individual defendant to
avoid unjust confinement, providing even maximum safeguards at
the hearing will not resolve the underlying problems of the men
tally ill. The type of services that most mentally ill people need are
just not available. If our society were to set for itself the goal of
planning, organizing, and staffing alternative facilities 142 on a scale
sufficient to make care available for each person who needs it, the
number of cases in which courts would have to reach questions
such as the standard of proof would decline dramatically. Resources
presently consumed by litigation over procedures could then be
turned to the far more profitable task of providing humane and
constructive care designed to help the mentally ill learn to "meet
the ordinary demands of life. "143

William H. Abrashkin
142.
143.

See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
RECULATIONS, supra note 19, § 200.01.

